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Abstract.  A principle, according to which any scientific theory 
can be mathematized, is investigated. That theory is 
presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly 
represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. 
In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet 
unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the 
sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it 
should be accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the 
relation of mathematics and reality. 
Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s 
phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of 
“bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano 
arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of 
mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the 
generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the 
axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. 
A comparison to Mach’s doctrine is used to be revealed the 
fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the 
final analysis.  
Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of 
mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to 
reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include 
reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two 
kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics 
and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle 
demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as 
above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics 
into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is 
not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an 
independent axiom. 
An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics  
is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. Thus  
the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to 
our being (rather than reality for reality is external only to 
Gödel mathematics) is discussed. An information 
interpretation of the Schrödinger equation is involved to 
illustrate the above problem.  
Key words: axiom of choice; axiom of induction; axiom of 
transfinite induction; eidetic, phenomenological and 
transcendental reduction; epoché; Gödel mathematics; Hilbert 
mathematics; information; quantum mechanics, quantum 
information; phenomenology; principle of universal 
mathematizability         
1 INTRODUCTION 
The great Norwegian scientist, mathematician and logician 
Thoralf Skolem (1922) introduced the “relativity of the notion 
of set” and the “improper interpretation” of a set-theory 
structure, based on the axiom of choice. One can demonstrate 
that they can serve as a ground of the logic of ground. 
The thesis is: The “improper interpretation” of an infinite 
set-theory structure founds the “proper interpretation” and thus 
that structure self-founds itself as the one interpretation of it can 
found the other. 
Furthermore, the interesting corollaries are implied about 
the theory of information for information can be introduced as 
a mapping of the proper into the improper interpretation of a 
mathematical structure being also a quantity of its complexity 
in the sense of Kolmogorov, Chaitin, and Martin-Löf (1965-
1977). Thus involved, the quantity of information can be 
interpreted as the quantity of “substance” or “being” of that 
structure allowing of self-grounding.    
The innovation cited in the beginning and known also as 
“Skolem’s paradox” can be discussed as a special property of 
infinity implying the concept of choice and thus of information:   
Indeed any finite set can be well-ordered without utilizing 
the axiom of choice. However that well-ordering is trivial and 
coincides with the identical mapping of the set into itself. In 
other words, the “improper interpretation” of any finite set is 
identical to the “proper one” of it. 
However, the same statement can be deduced in no way as 
to any infinite set and should be postulated being known as the 
well-ordering theorem (principle) which is equivalent to the 
axiom of choice.  
Thus, the sense of “Skolem’s paradox” is to demonstrate that 
the axiom of choice is equivalent to treating any infinite set not 
only as a countable one, but also even as a finite one just 
involving the “relativity of the notion of set”. Even more, any 
finite set can be in turn interpreted as an infinite one once the 
axiom of choice is admitted. 
Consequently, the extreme sense of “Skolem’s paradox” 
should be that the axiom of choice is equivalent to a one-to-one 
mapping of any finite into any infinite set therefore involving 
the concept of choice and thus of information as follows:  
That mapping required by the axiom of choice and requiring 
it in turn should be grounded on a generalized function 
(Schwartz distribution) replacing it with an usual function 
randomly choosing only one value of the function for any value 
of the independent variable (argument). Consequently, the 
concept of choice can be defined by a pair of a generalized 
function and a usual one obeying the above condition.  
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Furthermore, the quantity of information is definable as 
some mapping of those pairs into a number set. This is a 
generalized introduction of the quantity of information 
reducible to the standard definition of it where the set of the 
function values is finite for any value of the independent 
variable. It includes the quantity of quantum information in the 
case where that set is infinite for at least one value of the 
argument.   
The Kolmogorov – Chaitin – Martin-Löf measure of 
information as complexity can be obtained by the well-ordering 
of that mapping choice by choice. 
The special Skolem property of infinity implying both 
concepts of choice and information can be summarized so: 
If the axiom of choice is given, any infinite set possesses 
always an improper finite interpretation, which implies in turn 
that any finite set possesses an improper infinite interpretation. 
Thus the introduction of infinity under the axiom of choice 
implies the doubling of any mathematical structure either finite 
or infinite with an improper twin interpretation 
correspondingly either infinite or finite. 
That property can ground any consistent mathematical 
structure in itself by itself so: The improper interpretation can 
be always interpreted as the ground of the proper one and the 
improper and proper interpretations are isomorphic to each 
other. Consequently, that structure self-founds by the 
mediation of the improper twin interpretation. Thus the 
introduction of infinity in the pair of infinity and finiteness 
implies the self-foundation of any consistent mathematical 
structure under the condition of the axiom of choice. In other 
words, the concepts of choice and information by means of the 
axiom of choice implies for infinity and finiteness to be twined 
as two copies or two interpretations of some joint structure. 
However, if the axiom of choice does not hold, a gap divides 
finiteness from infinity. The same can be literally repeated as 
to the grounding and grounded, too: Thus the axiom of choice 
twins also them implying self-foundation. Its rejection divides 
them correspondingly into a meta-theory and a theory 
incommensurate to each other.      
The so-called completeness theorem of Gödel (1930) can 
serve as an illustration: The finite set of axioms and the infinite 
set of theorems implied by the formers under the conditions of 
the cited theorem can be considered as the above twin 
interpretations implying self-foundation (completeness). 
Accordingly, the so-called first incompleteness theorem of 
Gödel (1931) can be interpreted in the same context as the 
impossibility of an infinite set of statements to ground itself 
constructively (including Peano’s axioms) on the finite set of 
axioms (as including Peano’s axioms). The real distinction 
between the completeness (1930) and the incompleteness 
(1931) is due to the added constructiveness by means of Peano 
arithmetic. In other words, the completeness of mathematics 
can be only nonconstructive for Peano arithmetics. If one needs 
constructive completeness, the Peano arithmetic should be 
generalized, e g. by transfinite induction instead of induction as 
did Gentzen (1936, 1938) or by admitting the middle as to 
infinite sets as did intuitionism.    
Zermelo’s strategy (1908) of the foundation of set theory in 
a consistent way is another illustration: A set can be accepted 
to be a set if and only if it is a true subset of another set. This 
excludes the universal set. However, its sense in the above 
context is different: One can choose a relevant subset (B) of the 
complement to any set (A) so that the pair of A and B to be 
considered correspondingly as one of the proper and improper 
interpretation of some joint structure. Even more, Skolem’s 
innovation can serve as the base of a rigorous proof for 
consistency of the ZFC set theory.  
In fact, Skolem’s “paradox” is a breakthrough into the true 
understanding of infinity and its ability to constitute a self-
grounding pair with finiteness.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates 
Skolem’s paradox after the axiom of choice as the only 
consistent way to agree the finite Peano arithmetic with the 
transfinite (ZFC) set theory. Section 3 offers an inherently 
random and probabilistic description of the pure mathematical 
existence and thus an unambiguous description of any infinite 
set by a certain probability distribution. Section 4 interprets 
Schwartz’s distributions by probabilistic distribution and thus 
deduces the mutual complementarity of the choice of a set (E) 
as an equivalent to a certain infinite set and the choice of an 
element of E. Section 5 defines choice and information as pairs 
of Schwartz’s and probabilistic distribution. Section 6 offers the 
idea of dual completeness and compares it with the 
completeness by Gentzen’s transfinite induction and by the 
intuitionist “middle”. The conclusive Section 7 offers a 
viewpoint to mathematics and to its foundation from the theory 
of information. 
 2 SKOLEM’S PARADOX AS AN PRINCIPLE  
Set theory introduced the principle of abstraction [1] 
allowing of the generation of all elements of a set (interpretable 
as the extension of a notion) from a finite property featuring 
that set (as the definition or intension of the corresponding 
notion).  
Still the initial development of set theory generated the 
axiom of choice [2] equivalent to the so-called well-ordering 
theorem [2] or “well-ordering principle” in contemporary 
terms. According to it, any set can be mapped one-to-one into 
some subset of the set of natural numbers and thus well-
ordered. 
Semantics and semiotics of scientific theory elucidated it as 
a set of semantic units, which is well-ordered (“vocabulary of 
words”) and thus designating the investigated area of objects 
(“things”) in a way as ordered as possible, even well-ordered as 
an ideal by a one-to-one mapping between “words and things”. 
Scientific theory admits two kinds of exceptionally 
important formalizations: (i) as the intension of a rather 
extended notion, in which (i+ii) can be added well-ordering. 
The latter case corresponds to the deduction from first 
principles, which can be interpreted as the initial element of that 
well-ordering.  
This construction furthermore having the formal structure of 
logic is extended from the “beginning” of our knowledge in the 
first principles to the “end” itself of the being “by itself” (i.e. 
the biggest element of the lattice). Consequently, the first 
principles would complete our cognition as both logic and 
ontology.  
The organization of knowledge in notions is much more 
economical, efficient and convenient for retaining, 
reproducing, transferring, and utilization. However, if the 
notion is as extended as a scientific theory, it is too huge even 
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as a notion and needs a secondary compression to first 
principles and rules of deduction.  
The organization by first principles being a secondary 
ordering refers to some description or definition of a notion, 
which can be a fiction or description of non-existing objects. 
Both notion about real things (or facts) and fiction can be 
equally well deduced from or compressed to first principles.  
Thus that organization turns out to be especially relevant to 
mathematics. 
Philosophical phenomenology starting from Brentano and 
Husserl introduced (or restored from scholastic philosophy) the 
conception about intentionality of consciousness [3-8]. 
Especially Husserl being a mathematician in education and 
early carrier linked that fundamental and definitive property of 
consciousness to the essence of mathematical cognition by 
means of the concept of “epoché” [7, 9]:  
Indeed, mathematical cognition remains open the problem 
whether the described and investigated objects exist or not. In 
other words, mathematical cognition is invariant to and thus 
independent of the existence (“reality”) or non-existence of its 
objects.  
Thus attention turns out to be dual to the phenomenological 
“intention” [10-11] in a sense: It postulates its objects as real 
independently of whether they exist or not. So, the attention and 
intention constitutes a dual pair in dependence on whether the 
objects at issue are declared as real or not (here “not” does not 
mean for them to be declared as unreal or nonexisting, but that 
they might be real or unreal).  
Then one can speak of “attention” as the reverse operation 
to “epoché”: The latter takes or removes reality, and the former 
gives or adds reality. Thus attention being inherently linked to 
the problem of reality turns out to be a fundamental 
philosophical concept rather than only a psychological one. For 
example, if the operation of that philosophical “attention” is 
applied to any intention, one would obtain the corresponding 
“idea” or “eidos” (i.e. appearance as a whole) in a Platonic 
sense, i.e. as “reell”. 
Furthermore, “intention” has another counterpart, 
“intension” in logic, mathematics, epistemology, and cognitive 
science [10]. Intension is what is able to constitute 
unambiguously a separated unit such as a notion, set, image, or 
any unit of cognition by a finite definition, i.e. by a finite set of 
bound variables interpretable as the logical constant of that 
unit. An extension as the collection of objects, each of which 
satisfies the definition at issue, corresponds to any intension 
possibly as an empty one if the definition is contradictory. The 
collection may include as existing as nonexisting individuals.  
One can introduce the concept of “attension” as to any unit 
enumerated above, e.g. as to a notion. It means both all 
individuals of the extension as existing and their wholeness as 
existing, too. Thus “attension” is relative to “intension” and 
“extension”, on the one hand, and to the Platonic “idea” and 
“eidos”, on the other hand. Furthermore, “attension” can be 
defined as the application of the “philosophical attention” to 
any explicit or implicit (e.g. contextual) intension. 
Attension complements intension to the pair of both biggest 
and least element of the mathematical structure of lattice 
extended from the intention of consciousness to the idea 
                                                 
1 Heidegger underlay the problem of being as a deeper one [15]. 
therefore giving both logical and ontological structure of the 
notion or whatever else unit. That structure orders the extension 
in question in a potential taxonomy (i.e. classification of genera 
and species), the biggest element of which, i.e. the idea of the 
thing defined by the extension or even that thing itself or by 
itself, is generated just by the philosophical attention as the 
corresponding attension.   
On the contrary, if the notion or unit is supplied as usual by 
any logical or ontological structure, thus its attension is 
implicitly certain, too.   
The initial research of Husserl about the psychological 
foundation of arithmetic (1887-1891) [13-14] leaded him to 
opposite conclusion in the later “Logical Investigations” (1900-
1901), namely that psychology (and further philosophy) should 
be underlain rather by logic and mathematics.  
In fact, the initial base of that synthesis can be found even in 
Ancient Greece in Pythagoreanism, in the origin itself of 
philosophy, and a little later, in Plato’s doctrine and Euclid’s 
geometry. The German idealism including the subject and mind 
as a fundamental philosophical category had been what allowed 
of Husserl to add psychology in that huge synthesis.  
The link in question is grounded in the way of cognition in 
logic and mathematics, philosophy, and the seen in thus 
psychology rather than in any reference to reality, to 
experienced or experimental data for the reality itself should be 
inferred in particular by the new approach of phenomenology: 
This suggests for reality not to be presupposed, but to be 
“bracketed” initially [7, 9].  
Indeed, logic and mathematics do not connect the concept of 
truth, in their framework, to any confirmation by external 
reality. Therefore, they do not presuppose any reality, and their 
cognition is independent of reality as a hypothesis or premise. 
As to philosophy, it ought not to presuppose reality for the 
reality itself is its main problem1. At last, psychology should 
not be referred to reality as far as its object of research is just 
that being, which seems to be opposed to and thus separated 
from reality, namely mind and psychics2.  
Thus logic & mathematics, philosophy, and psychology 
need and would share a relevant method of research, which 
should be independent of the hypothesis (or axiom) of reality. 
In particular, that method cannot be experimental or ground on 
any experience in reality.  
Logic and mathematics as the most advanced ones in that 
kind of cognition can suggest its extended model and 
interpretation where “intension” would correspond to 
“intention”, and “extension” to some area of reality relevant to 
that intension at issue.  
Then “attension” is the “extension” with reality added 
secondarily as far as reality cannot be presupposed in 
phenomenological research.  
Husserl, both mathematician and philosopher, was who 
offered a new reading of transcendentalism, mathematical in 
essence. The transcendental might be understood as the 
collection of all possibilities therefore interpreting the 
“condition of possibility” in thus. Mathematics accepts 
consistency seen as the possibility of existence as mathematical 
existence as well. The collection of all possibilities might be 
defined as a certain invariant shared by all possibilities at issue, 
2 Heidegger refuted this, the latter, and Husserl blamed him for 
“naturalization” [16]. 
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obtainable by “eidetic reduction”, which is phenomenological 
in the sense of Husserl’s psychology, or transcendental in his 
philosophy. One might say that eidetic, phenomenological and 
transcendental reduction are only different senses (or contexts) 
of one and the same meaning [9] mapping all possibilities of a 
kind into their shared invariant. Then Husserl’s opposition of 
the phenomenological (transcendental) to the naturalistic might 
be further thought as the opposition of the set of all 
possibilities, defined by their invariant, to an arbitrary and 
therefore random element of the same set.  
For example, the system of mind-brain unifies somehow 
both aspects allowing to be described as both mind (i.e. 
phenomenologically and transcendentally) and brain (i.e. 
naturalistically). One might even postulate that kind of duality 
as the essential feature of that system, necessary for its relevant 
definition. If that is the case, and Husserl’s approach to the 
transcendental and naturalistic is used, one would need a 
certain equation of the transcendental and the naturalistic to 
define relevantly the system of mind-brain.  
The interpretation of the mind-brain system as a quantum 
system [17-19, 11] satisfies the condition for an element of a 
set to be equated to the set, and therefore that of the reduction 
whether eidetic or phenomenological, or transcendental in 
Husserl’s sense.  
Quantum mechanics being only an exemplification and 
interpretation of a much more general set including it shares the 
same property, namely, the equivalence of a set to its element. 
Then, the term “quantum system” means it in the sense of both 
quantum mechanics and generalization definable by that 
equivalence of ‘set’ and ‘element’. 
No finite and constructive element can satisfy that kind of 
equivalence. Even more, that equivalence is interpretable as a 
version of Dedekind’s definition of infinity [20], [21]. 
However, if the axiom of choice is attached, a finite, though 
unknown in principle, set equivalent one-to-one to each one 
infinite set should exist “purely” and mathematically, i.e. only 
possibly, but not ever actually. That paradoxical corollary is 
implied by Skolem’s consideration [22] of the “relativeness of 
‘set’” (1922). Thus infinity is decomposable to finiteness and 
randomness if randomness be equated to “pure” (never actual) 
possibility.   
Then by interpreting in terms of mind-brain, a random 
element of the one half of that duality would correspond to each 
one element of the other. This is equivalent to the suggested by 
Niels Bohr conception about mind-brain complementarity [23], 
[24] as a generalization of complementarity in quantum 
mechanics.  
One can interpret the “phenomena” in Husserl’s sense as the 
existences (“existentia”) of the “things themselves” or by 
themselves. Husserl rejected that approach as “naturalization” 
of his phenomenology [25-26]. Heidegger himself, though 
revising or developing far further Husserl’s phenomenology, 
refuted to be an “existentialist” [27].  
He tried to reinterpret Greek philosophy especially a few 
Pre-Socratics in that manner, in which the phenomenon (as 
“meaning it in itself by itself”) might be identified as naïvely as 
wisely with the being (inseparable from the existence) of each 
certain thing.  
The same approach of Heidegger penetrates, for example, 
his extended comment on a single fragment (B, 1) from 
Aristotle’s Physics [29]. The part in question refers to the 
concept of “Φύσις” at all, and Heidegger’s reflection addresses 
the relation of that term in Greek philosophy and Aristotle’s 
particularly to the modern European understanding of nature as 
opposed to both human being and technics. 
Heidegger’s way of interpretation merges the things and 
their Platonic “ideas” in the initial Φύσις thinkable as both χάος 
and ἀλήθεια. Heidegger means the latter as that truth relevant 
to both Greek and his philosophy: ἀλήθεια is ἀ-λήθεια, i.e. the 
appearance at all from hiddenness as un-hiddenness. That 
concept of truth is not underlain by any opposition to anything: 
it has not the form of the Latin adaequatio, the origin of which 
is often searched again in Aristotle.  
Truth as ἀ-λήθεια is phenomenon as appearance where 
being and existence are both yet and initially inseparable from 
each other. Thus truth as ἀ-λήθεια is φύσις at the same time. 
Nature is Truth before any opposition, particularly that of 
human being to nature. 
Further, the Greek τέχνη is seen in the same way rather than 
in the modern manner as creating something artificial, 
technical, which has not existed in a natural way, and even it 
might not exist in nature in principle: τέχνη cannot be the 
modern technics at all.  
On the contrary, τέχνη means the hidden essence to be 
revealed, literally the veil to be removed, and thus truth to be 
seen: τέχνη is not and cannot be opposed to φύσις, it assists for 
the human beings to be able to observe the φύσις in an obvious 
way.  
For example, a wooden chair reveals the strength and 
reliability of the tree, from which the chair has been made. That 
τέχνη is not opposed furthermore to philosophy and poetry: It 
may be thought as another, namely material way of 
philosophizing or poeticizing.  
Aristotle’s ἐντελέχεια is interpreted analogically and 
relatively to τέχνη: it means the “essence to be given at the end” 
in Heidegger’s interpretation, i.e. as the ultimate stage in the 
natural development. One may say that mankind and nature 
collaborate with each other by means correspondingly of τέχνη 
and of natural development both sharing ἐντελέχεια as their 
essence.  
What should be the Bedeutung (in the sense of Frege [30]) 
of metaphor?  
It should be equated to an equivalent proposition, e.g. as in 
“sad moon” to “The moon is sad”. However, that proposition is 
false in definition: otherwise it would not correspond to a 
metaphor. Furthermore, both false and metaphoric propositions 
share that they are wrong, but any wrong proposition is not a 
metaphor, even quite not: the metaphor is too rare and valuable 
because of that. 
Any proposition needs to be understood nevertheless 
whether it is true or false before any Bedeudung to be assigned 
to it. However, both false and metaphoric propositions have 
been understood in advance, and thus understanding cannot 
serve as a demarcation line between them. Anyway, the attitude 
to the understanding is different for each of them. It is a 
preliminary stage as to a non-metaphoric proposition, after 
which it can acquire its Bedeutung of being false or not. The 
understanding is absolutely sufficient as to a metaphor or 
metaphoric proposition for being definitively false.  
One can summarize: Understanding is the Bedeutung of 
metaphor, but not of false proposition.  
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The Bedeutung of a false proposition is namely “false”, and 
any true proposition cannot be a metaphor or equivalent to a 
metaphor.  
The next question is naturally to be the reversed one: A 
certain understanding is granted as Bedeutung. Which is the 
proposition true to that fact, e.g. to a metaphor? 
A few preliminary notes are necessary. Human cognition 
can address as nature as culture. If the latter is the case, culture 
is put and opposed as a special kind of nature consisting of 
artefacts rather than facts and social events rather than 
phenomena. All of those kinds share the fact of understanding 
for no artefact might be created and no social event might 
happen without human understanding though they need not to 
be true to the facts or phenomena of nature. All culture shares 
understanding rather than adequacy to nature. Of course, some 
parts of culture, e.g. natural sciences can search for that 
adequacy, but they as well as the rest in culture share 
understanding fundamentally. 
Consequently, the Bedeutung of metaphor as understanding 
is essential in all cognition of culture, but not in natural 
sciences, which add a new distinction of being either false or 
true as to the understood after understanding, though they share 
understanding as a necessary (but already extremely 
insufficient for them) condition being a part of human culture. 
If hermeneutics is defined as the way (or method) of 
cognition of culture, it needs understanding as a fundamental 
concept, and the case study of metaphor may serve as a 
linguistic model or exemplification of hermeneutics.  
Philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer [15, 
31] originated of Husserl’s phenomenology [32], which 
suggested a new approach to the philosophical problem of 
consciousness. One might deduce the understanding in culture 
from the intentionality of consciousness for both “bracket” the 
adequacy to reality therefore addressing a new kind of reality, 
human reality, and a new kind of truth, which is not grounded 
on adequacy. It is called by Heidegger Alethea [15, 33] 
“unhiddeness” and it is applicable to the Bedeutung of 
metaphor as understanding. Indeed, anything which is 
understood comes out, exits from hiddenness, appears in 
“unhiddeness” sharing truth as Alethea nevertheless whether it 
is adequate to a certain external reality or not.  
Then, which should be the proposition true to the fact that a 
certain understanding is granted as Bedeutung? The 
interpretation of “true” is ambiguous. If it is true as adequacy, 
that proposition should be equivalent to the understanding, e.g. 
as “The moon is sad” to “sad moon”.  
If it is true in the sense of Alethea, it should be  
an understanding of the understanding, a continuation in  
the same field of openness as unhiddeness (e.g. Heidegger’s 
“Lichtung” [33]). In other words, it should be a new verse after 
the verse, which is just thus understood, following Heidegger’s 
“Dichtung” [34], or a new text in the track of the text being 
understood just in thus, following Derrida’s “trace” [35-36].  
One can summarize that any understanding granted as 
Bedeutung can be described by one or more propositions 
adequate to the understanding as in humanities. Furthermore, 
the understanding can be understood by means of a new 
understanding, i.e. an interpretation, and thus kept, conserved 
and continued as a tradition (in Gadamer [31]).   
Particularly, Ricœur’s “true-and-false metaphor” [37], 
reminiscent of Schrödinger’s “alive-and-dead cat” [38] rather 
essentially and fruitfully, can be interpreted consistently: 
Metaphor is true as understanding, but false as adequacy. 
There is a fundamental philosophical problem about the 
relation of what is outside of consciousness to what is inside of 
consciousness. It implies that some boundaries of 
consciousness should exist in some sense to be the articulation 
of the former problem meaningful. On the contrary, the 
impossibility for that problem to be resolved is consistent to 
limitless consciousness as what is often interpreted God in 
theology.  
A rather paradoxical equivalent to limitless consciousness 
was elaborated by Heidegger, but ascribed by him to Greeks: If 
Socrates’s problem of human being had not been involved, 
therefor returning to pre-Socratics, all is being for there is not 
human being and thus any boundaries between the former and 
the latter do not exist. The concept itself of “Gegenstand” [29] 
as the opposing or being opposed to human being should be 
cancelled and erased.  
Removing the human being is absolutely inacceptable for 
theology. Theology needs human being not less than God. So 
that kind of limitless consciousness as omnipresence being at 
the expense of cancelling the problem of human being is not 
equivalent to what theology means though that is consistent to 
limitlessness after removing the borders between what is inside 
and what is outside of consciousness.  Heidegger in turn 
expressively rejected Sartre’s “Existentialism is humanism” 
[39] as well as any link of his own doctrine (or “thinking”) to 
existentialism and even “Sein und Zeit” later as far as it allowed 
of existentialist interpretations [28].  
Consequently, theology or at least Christian theology 
conserves the problem of those borders but interprets it in terms 
of the relation of human being and God. Heidegger’s term 
“ontotheology” [40] meant probably the same conservation, but 
as incoherent to his own thinking.  
In fact, Heidegger’s doctrine originated from Husserl’s 
phenomenology rather than from Greek pre-Socratic 
philosophy immediately. Husserl’s approach “bracketed” 
reality to reach the “phenomena” of consciousness. Thus, the 
question itself, about the borders of consciousness, turns out to 
be “bracketed”, and the “phenomena” in Husserl’s sense are 
invariant to the transformation “inside – outside” of 
consciousness. The question of those borders is rather 
meaningless as to the “phenomena” [41]. Then Heidegger’s 
step is to interpret those invariant “phenomena” as being rather 
than as consciousness. Being is not existence, but invariant to 
existence and thus to human being. 
Husserl himself interpreted his own doctrine in different 
periods by means of Brentano’s (or scholastic) intentionality 
[5], [42] of consciousness, of Descartes’s apodictic 
consciousness [43], [44] and of Kant’s transcendental 
consciousness [7] (and even of solipsism and “egology” [43] 
eventually interpreted as transcendental). Christian theology 
seems to be much more tolerant to Husserl than to Heidegger 
[46]. [47] One can generalize that Husserl remains always 
within consciousness, though expands it in a way to include the 
world. [48]  
However, another interpretation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology never shared by him himself might be 
grounded on mathematical cognition [49], [50] for he was a 
mathematician in education and early carrier. Indeed, 
mathematics is what has “bracketed” and always “brackets” 
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reality being invariant to it. The mathematical abstractions are 
always “eidetic reductions” consistent to both reality and 
possibility. Further, eidetic reduction can be generalized to 
“phenomenological reduction” and “transcendental reduction” 
and include all contents of consciousness. Thus, first, 
psychology and then philosophy seem to be formulable as 
“strenge Wissenschaft” as mathematics. From that viewpoint, 
Husserl’s doctrine might be classed as a form of neo-
Pythagoreanism, say “transcendental Pythagoreanism”.  
In turn, that reading of Husserl’s phenomenology can be 
applied to Heidegger’s doctrine in a way to make the latter even 
still more radical. That thinking might be illustrated as a 
continuation in Heidegger’s return to the origin of philosophy. 
Indeed, Heidegger did not include the Pythagoreans among the 
pre-Socratics [51]. His “homecoming” of philosophy reaches 
the Word of Heraclitus but not the Number of Pythagoras. 
Before Socrates’s alleged overturn of being to human being, 
one might allege an earlier overturn of the Pythagorean Number 
to the Word of Heraclitus. Indeed, the Word and language 
presupposed understanding, the fundamental concept of 
philosophical or phenomenological hermeneutics invented or 
shared by Heidegger. If understanding is reduced further to 
human understanding, the reduction of being to human being is 
more than natural only after which the question of borders 
between the former and the latter might appear.  
The further return in the origin of philosophy from the Word 
to the Number would mean in turn further desubjectification, 
but further dehumanization, too. The Word suggests 
understanding and thus admits human understanding, but the 
Number needs not either. It substitutes understanding by 
calculation. The tendency for philosophy to become an exact 
science leads to dehumanization in the final analysis if it is 
consistent enough. Indeed, the problem about the borders of 
consciousness disappear in thin air after that consistency, but 
human being, humanism, and then even understanding, and the 
being itself disappear in turn in the same way. 
One can generalize that the problem of the borders of 
consciousness is among those problems which would be better 
not to be resolved rather then that they really cannot be 
resolved. The inconsistency of philosophy is fruitful. It allows 
of philosophy to be human philosophy just as understanding the 
human understanding, and ‘being’ to be restricted as the human 
being. Heidegger wrote about that “petitio principii” only 
which was able to allow of any science and even being to 
appear [29].  
One can remind that Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans had 
kept their doctrine in both strict confidence and seclusion 
accessible only to the chosen ones [52]. Maybe they believed 
that it contents truth too destroying for mankind. Nowadays, we 
are able to reconstruct that too dangerous truth as consistent 
dehumanization to digitalization whether correctly or 
incorrectly.               
       
 
 
3  PURE MATHEMATHICAL EXISTENCE 
AND ANY IFINITE SET AS A CERTAIN 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
There are a few main groups of explicit objections to 
mathematization of science along with implicit unacceptance 
and passive resistance, which can be extracted [53-62]:  
(1) Mathemazation cannot be universal in principle. 
Mathematics creates only a more or less successful model (if 
any) which is fundamentally different from reality. The 
difference between any mathematical model and reality is 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Thus, that difference is 
beyond the range of mathematics in definition.   
(2) Furthermore mathematization is not universal as a matter 
of fact. There are many sciences which do not admit any 
mathematization in principle. Some sciences such history or 
liberal arts study unique events, facts, or artefacts. They involve 
often human interpretation, values, and estimations. 
Mathematization is meaningless to them for it would deprive 
them of essence.  
(3) Other sciences such as psychology or sociology study 
human factor whether in an individual or in society. Human 
factor does not allow mathematization in principle. 
(4)  Mathematization in many sciences, e.g. such as history, 
social sciences, biology, and even chemistry, etc. refer to 
unessential and auxiliary features or subdomains. Thus the core 
of those scientific disciplines is untouched by mathematization. 
(5) Though possible in principle, mathematization in a 
fundamental sense is inconvenient for practical use. Engineer 
and applied sciences utilize often empirical and semi-empirical 
functional dependences, which need not and are not connected 
to the correspondent fundamental sciences. The way to be 
deduced is often both unknown and never investigated. On the 
contrary, the attempts to be deduced simplified formulas for 
daily use from the fundamental equations met insurmountable 
issues, difficulties, obstacles and need groundless assumptions.  
(6) Though mathematization is successful and practically 
applicable, its use needs immense calculations, which are 
beyond the present options even of supercomputers or are non-
value-added because of the calculation cost. 
(7) The mathematical models are unstable and deviate too 
considerably at slight deviations of the initial conditions  
(the “butterfly effect”).  
 (8) Though the universal or partial mathematization might 
be possible in principle, it is dehumanizing and thus harmful.                  
The list does not pretend to be exhausted. Its claim is only 
to hint the huge volume of objections to mathematization, on 
the one hand, and to situate the present proof for universal 
constructive mathemazability of science on that background, 
on the other hand.    
The proof does not refer to the group of objections (5), (6), 
(7), and (8) in any way. It touches the groups (2) and (3) only 
indirectly. Its meaning should be properly related to (1) and (4), 
but even then only partly.  
Its sense in the background of those various objections may 
be described so: 
As far as any science is exhibited in natural language, it 
admits exhausted mathematization by certain mathematical 
structures. The point is the extension from the rather obvious 
fact as to the exhibition in rigorous notions and consistently to 
the exhibition in any text in natural language thus covering all 
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sciences (all sciences are represented in natural languages, but 
only a small part of them is already mathematized).   
In other words, any text implies the option of 
mathematization rather than only any logically consistent text, 
in which the semantic units (such words) are well-defined as 
notions, and then well-ordered in syllogisms. This means that 
the difference between mathematics, called in Renaissance 
“Language of Nature” [53], and natural languages is neither 
fundamental nor even essential, but rather conventional.    
Quantum mechanics was the scientific domain, which first 
met contextuality as to the language of nature. Before that, 
contextuality featured only human language and even it was 
considered as its disadvantage, which had to be “cured” by 
exact notions and definitions and a correct and rigorous logical 
order.   
The overturn of common viewpoint for quantum mechanics 
was so drastic, unexpected, and sudden, that it was put “in 
quarantine”, so that its “ridiculous conclusions” to be restricted 
to it itself and “classified” by complex technical calculations. 
The philosophical interpretation of its mathematical formalism 
based on the complex Hilbert space ceased gradually to be 
tolerated. The understanding of what in fact quantum stated 
was substituted by experimentally testable applications of it 
without explanations of what they should mean.    
What forced quantum mechanics to so decisive steps was the 
necessity due to the existence of the fundamental natural Plank 
constant to find that kind of mathematical structure, which is 
invariant to the transformation between the discrete and 
continuous (usually even smooth) physical action. Classical 
mechanics is continuous (smooth). However, the Planck 
constant having the physical dimension of action, though 
exceptionally small, measures the action in quanta, i.e. by 
integers. The common explanation is that the actions in the 
Plank scale are discrete, but they seem as being continuous 
macroscopically for the exponent of the Planck constant is  
“– 34” to our daily measure units.  
In fact, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics 
speaks otherwise. What it says is known as “wave – particle 
duality”.  It implies that quantum motion is both discrete and 
continuous (smooth) simultaneously. Any representation 
challenges common sense. As a corollary, quantum mechanics 
was forced to equate subjective and objective probability and 
even the possible and actual physically (the so-called 
probabilistic or Born interpretation of wave function [63]).  
The “free will theorems” [64-65] can be deduced once both 
nonlocal formalism due to the complex Hilbert space and the 
local signaling for special relativity are granted simultaneously. 
Quantum mechanics is neither local nor non-local. It is both 
local and nonlocal.  
As to the general problem of universal mathematization, two 
its conclusions are especially important: 
(1) The necessity to be equated the discrete and continuous 
(smooth) to each other implies furthermore canceling the 
purely qualitative difference of model and reality. If quantum 
mechanics is true (as it seems to be), model and reality might 
coincide in particular, and the difference between them is both 
only quantitative sharing the mathematical formalism and 
qualitative as a mathematical formalism and as a separated 
reality simultaneously and in general [66]. That conclusion 
contradicts immediately to the objection (1) above.  
(2) Quantum mechanics implies contextuality as to the 
language of nature [67]. Human language and the language of 
nature as what mathematics has accepted since the age of 
Galileo and Newton cannot be distinguished from each other 
for that identifier. Thus a huge obstacle for mathematics to 
penetrate all human knowledge is removed. 
Still one objection, which can be added, refers to explicit 
Husserl’s criticism to “Galilean mathematization” in one of the 
last works published in his lifetime, “The crisis of European 
sciences and transcendental philosophy; an introduction to 
phenomenology” [68], [56]. As if Husserl himself rejects 
universal mathematization even as one of the sources of “the 
crisis of European sciences”. Consequently, any 
“mathematizing” interpretation of his phenomenology should 
be refused in turn, too.  
Two main considerations on his criticism can be mentioned: 
(1) Husserl criticized the universal substitution of qualities 
by quantities as naturalizing mathematization. Thus, what was 
meant was just Galilean mathematization rather than 
mathematization in general.  
Mathematization had been done incorrectly since the age of 
Galileo being linked to naturalization and sensual qualities. 
One can suggest implicitly another mathematization grounded 
on “epoché” rather than on naturalization for mathematics 
really abstains from the statement of reality. Consequently, the 
adequate mathematization should be based on the approach of 
mathematics rather than on that strange assumption of reality 
external to mathematics.  
(2) The criticism to “Galilean mathematization” should be 
seen as coherent and consistent to all other works of Husserl 
rather than opposed to them. He extended the approach of 
mathematics for abstaining of reality to those sciences such as 
psychology and philosophy, which should not presuppose 
reality, for the reality itself is their object and subject and a kind 
of petitio principii appeares.      
4 SCHWARTZ’S DISTRIBUTION AND 
PROBABILISTIC DISTRIBUTION   
Still the original “razor”, Occam’s was created to remove 
redundant hypotheses and unfounded assumptions. They are 
the source of delusions and confusions.  
Science still since the age of Euclid and Greek philosophy 
has aspired after the reduction of all knowledge and being to a 
few first principles or elements, from which all the rest might 
be deduced logically and convincingly. In other words, science 
has always utilized that “razor” as a methodological principle. 
However, science of the modern age invented another 
“razor”, that of experience and experiments. Both “razors” are 
the ground of science in nowadays, however they often offer 
different results inconsistent to each other.  
Occam’s razor removes redundant hypotheses and restricts 
the appearance of new facts inconsistent to the established 
principles. On the contrary, the experimental razor removes 
established principles by new facts. So, science turns to be 
doubly razored, both to outdated principles and redundant 
assumptions.      
However, the two razors are directed oppositely to each 
other, and the intersection of their joint action might generate 
only an empty set for the ideal, doubly razored science. 
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If one identify Russell’s barber’s razor3 with both razors 
treating science, the emptiness of the set above might be 
proved: the one razor corresponds to that intended to those who 
do not razor themselves (as the established principles razored 
externally by the facts), and the other razor, to those who razor 
themselves (as the established principles razoring themselves 
from redundant hypotheses). Thus the established principles 
turn out to be in Russell’s barber’s position. 
Mach’s doctrine including both descriptivism and 
phenomenalism can be considered as one of the most elegant 
way out of the contradiction. As Russell’s barber’s existence, 
the existence of a nonempty intersection of the action of both 
razors is able to be postulated without any contradiction. Its 
elements can be called “sensual” or however else, and then, two 
different, even disjunctive contexts of use (or interpretation) are 
able to be introduced: as first principles of description, from 
which any derivative description in science can be deduced 
consistently; and as first elements of the phenomena 
experienced immediately or by experiments.  
Mach’s approach has the double advantage to be both 
simplest and self-applicable. His “razor” removes the 
hypothesis of reality or God as equally redundant therefore 
angering both Church and materialists such as Lenin.  
Thus, Mach’s doctrine can be seen as a kind of radical, 
fundamental and philosophical reductionism or “ontological 
reductionism” according to Oxford companion to philosophy. 
Of course, the real reductionism in science does not refer to the 
elements of the being itself as a rule, in the exceptions of which 
Mach is almost alone for he applied his approach to physics 
influencing Einstein’s thought to general relativity though 
rejecting his relation to it later. 
In fact, reductionism in science and philosophy share that of 
removing the redundant, therefore being quite relative as a 
common structure though interpreted in different contexts and 
degree of generalization.  
The realization of Mach’s doctrine as reductionism assists 
to be further discussed Husserl’s phenomenology in the same 
way for Husserl himself introduced three kinds of (just right) 
reduction as the methods for one to achieve to phenomenology 
from reality. 
Husserl distinguished himself from Mach’s phenomenalism 
flatly. What is the essential difference between Mach’s and 
Husserl’s “phenomenon”? All phenomena after Mach are 
complexes of one and the same elements and thus only different 
re-orderings of them. Indeed, Mach’s elements are not 
Boltzmann’s atoms; however both kinds generate phenomena 
similarly, by their reordering as still Democritus suggested.  
The phenomenon after Husserl is maybe rather the shared 
eidos of real things therefore unified them as a class. That eidos 
cannot be and is not defined in relation to some universal 
elements whatever they would be. It can be defined only to 
relation of that class real things, from which can be obtained by 
reduction and only then postulated as generating them. Thus, 
Mach’s descriptivism can be conserved. 
The dimensions of reduction of reality are quite different 
after Husserl in comparison with those after Mach. They are 
mathematical for the former, but physical for the latter. If one 
finds a way to unify physics and mathematics into a single 
                                                 
3 The kidding version of Russell’s paradox about the set of all sets is 
meant. 
science erasing or fulfilling the gap between them, this will be 
at the same time a way to unify Husserl’s phenomenology with 
Mach’s phenomenalism.     
5 CHOICE AND INFORMATION BY A PAIR 
OF SCHWARTZ’S AND PROBABILISTIC 
DISTRIBUTION    
One can attempt to overcome the obvious mismatch between 
Husserl’s phenomenology and Mach’s phenomenalism right 
utilizing the razor of Mach’s economy of thought ... however to 
itself. 
In fact, Mach’s elements, whatever they are called and 
would be, are only a new hypothesis. The principle of economy 
of thought would remove them if the same result might be 
achieved without their utilization. Even more, Husserl’s 
phenomenology might be recognized as Mach’s 
phenomenalism razored from the redundant elements. 
Indeed, those elements are situated on the boundary between 
consciousness and reality therefore to bridge them over the gap 
deducing consciousness in the one direction, and reality in the 
opposite direction. One can define them more economically as 
something middle, the only necessary property of which is to 
suspend the law of excluded middle as to the pair of reality and 
consciousness.  
Consequently, the principle of economy of thought applied 
to Mach’s elements themselves reduces them to suspending 
“excluded middle” as to reality and consciousness. The nature 
of that middle exhausts itself by being right “middle” as what 
the reduction after Husserl allows of being thought.  
Indeed, the middle between reality and phenomenon in 
Husserl is reduction. Returning back to Mach, his “elements” 
might be already interpreted as successive stages of the process 
of reduction. Their names are only ordinal natural numbers 
after they should be common for any process of reduction to 
any phenomenon. That commonness is required by Mach’s way 
to be defined the elements. 
Summarizing, if Mach’s elements are deliberated from any 
metaphysical nature just according to his doctrine, they turn out 
to be natural numbers generating consciousness in the one 
direction, and reality in the opposite direction. Then 
furthermore, they are absolutely consistent to Husserl’s 
phenomenology as the successive stage of reduction leading 
from reality to phenomena.  
There is still one, even more economical scheme for the 
same, realized by Brouwer’s intuitionism: after both 
consciousness and reality are derivative from natural numbers, 
they themselves might be interpreted as two kinds of numbers: 
finite natural numbers and transfinite ordinal numbers, and the 
middle consists only in admitting the middle between the two 
kinds of numbers. If all those are granted, any “creative 
subject” might construct the universe.          
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6 DUAL COMPLETENESS   
At first glance, the opposition of mathematical reductionism to 
scientific reductionism is wrong for mathematics is one among 
the other sciences. Nevertheless, its type of reductionism is 
essentially different from that in all the rest:  
Its fundamental method, the axiomatic and deductive one is 
reductionist. Its universal validity in the contemporary 
mathematics implies that any entity claiming to be 
mathematical has to be equivalently reducible to a certain 
structure, which can be exhaustedly described by a few axioms. 
All mathematics is strictly subordinated by complete 
reducibility leading to arithmetic (the natural numbers) and set 
theory. 
The reducibility in all other sciences, even in physics, which 
shares rather features of mathematics, is only partial and 
unstrict. There are even sciences such as esthetics founded on 
subjective estimation and interpretation or such as history 
avoiding any generalization and describing events as unique. 
Nevertheless, one or other form of reductionism might exist in 
each of them. How many the sciences and even the theories and 
methods are, so many the kind of reductionisms are.  
The reductionism in mathematics in that background is total 
and maximal. Particularly, it does not admit any exceptions. 
That exception in any mathematical theory testifies 
incompleteness. The incompleteness as well as any 
contradiction means its inconsistency: that theory is false. 
Consequently, mathematics is the only science where the 
concepts of truth and reducibility are inherently linked to each 
other. All other science even partially irreducible can be 
nevertheless true for the correspondence to reality. 
Mathematics does not presuppose reality: the condition of 
that is total reductionism. Consequently, its reductionism is 
founded in the kind of truth in it and in the renunciation of (the 
concept of) reality. 
Hilbert mathematics involves that kind of total reductionism 
into the being itself. The ultimate base are the natural numbers 
as still Kroneker proclaimed. 
One can visualize that being in Hilbert mathematics utilizing 
Einstein’s way to exemplify the curvature of space-time in 
general relativity. He used the two-dimensional analogy of a 
curved surface, to which people have immediate sensual 
intuition about both externality and internality of it. 
One can figure that the creatures in a computer game have 
consciousness and perceive its environment and their bodies 
approximately as we perceive them … or ours. Nevertheless, 
we being right outside of the computer, which is their universe, 
know very well that their existence as well the environment are 
only software programs, bits of information of a Turing 
machine.  
Then we might imagine our universe as a quantum computer 
where the alleged boundary between software and hardware is 
already overcome by quantum information and its units, the 
qubits. Any qubit is both software and hardware corresponding 
to each other, but always disjunctive being complementary to 
each other.  
The base in the former and in the latter case is one and the 
same: information, though classical information and separated 
hardware, on the one hand, and quantum information merging 
with the hardware, on the other hand. 
The former case corresponds to Gödel mathematics, 
 the latter case to Hilbert mathematics, and the present analogy 
between those cases to the model of Hilbert mathematics into 
Gödel mathematics, intended to demonstrated the not less 
consistence of the former to that of the latter.  
Furthermore, in Hilbert mathematics, the transition between 
mathematics and physics should be gradual and smooth. The 
concept and quantity of information and its theory can be that 
“middle” situated between mathematics and physics 
transforming the former into the latter gradually. 
In essence, information can be considered not less as those 
elements ultimate as Mach’s, which generate in one context, 
that of consciousness, mathematics and all phenomena in 
Husserl’s sense, but into the opposite context, that of reality, 
initially the physical and further all the rest in the universe, i.e. 
reality.    
Information can be thought as the more fundamental 
generalization of the natural numbers where the natural 
numbers are right considered as those ultimate elements 
generating both conscious and reality as two equally probable 
disjunctive alternatives. 
Indeed, any bit of information can be interpreted as the 
empty cell of a natural number, in which can be recorded either 
“0” = “consciousness” or “1” = reality. Before any recording, 
the sell is only a natural number. 
 
7 MATHEMATICS AND ITS FOUNDATION 
FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE THEORY 
OF INFORMATION   
The statement is: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to 
some mathematical structure in a way constructive (that is not 
as a proof of “pure existence” in a mathematical sense). 
The statement needs a few preliminary elucidations. 
(1) In fact, what will be proved is that any scientific theory, 
which is exhibited in natural language, admits that 
isomorphism constructively. One can object that a wider set of 
texts including the scientific theories allows of 
mathematization. This seems to be namely so. However, the 
question about which texts are scientific theories [69] is rather 
difficult to be answered unambiguously.  
Nevertheless, any scientific theory is a text otherwise  
a counterexample might be demonstrated. This means that the 
following arguments as a sketch of proof can be considered as 
an implicit definition about that wider set of texts including the 
scientific theories: those texts which ate a true part of more 
extended texts and thus refer to nonempty contexts. That kind 
of definition forbids only the consideration of any text claiming 
to be scientific as universal, i.e. without any context. It is 
similar to Zermelo’s way out from the paradoxes in set theory 
[70]: any set is a true subset of another, and if not it is not a set. 
No scientific text is a universal dogma, which is always valid 
independently of its context and therefore corresponds to 
Poper’s criterion [71] not to be “metaphysical”.   
(2) The sketch of the proof can be divided into three cases, 
which are rather unequal in a mathematical sense. The first two 
ones are almost obvious and they need not to be proved, or in 
other words, their proof is “trivial”. Nevertheless, their 
interpretation including philosophical interpretation is not less 
important than that of the third case properly needing a 
mathematical proof. 
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(3) The term ‘theory’ is used rather in an internal sense than 
in an external sense. This means that the question about their 
confirmation in reality by experience or experiments is 
“bracketed” in a phenomenological manner. Consequently,  
the term should include also hypotheses still yet neither 
corroborated nor rejected as well as even old, already refused 
hypotheses.  
(4) The first case is that of a classical theory exhibited 
consistently, i.e. by well-defined notions well-ordered in 
syllogisms. A mathematical theory deduced from a complete 
and consistent set of axiom can be considered as the “ideal 
case” (in the sense of Max Weber’s “idealtypus” [72]) of that 
first case. Of course, a mathematical theory does not need any 
additional mathematization for it is mathematized in definition. 
All theories of the first case are differed slightly from their ideal 
case.  
The term “slightly” as it is used above needs a more certain 
justification. “Slightly” is used in relation to the degree of 
separation of the theoretical text from its context as well as to 
those degrees as to the notions or postulates (principles) inside 
the text itself.  The ideal case corresponds to absolute 
separation. One might argue even that the ideal case of 
scientific theory is not a scientific theory for it does not have 
any context in fact after it can be absolutely separated from its 
context. However, this does not contradict to Weber’s concept 
of idealtypus [72].  
This means that the text is a whole in isolation from and 
independent of its context. The same refers to its notions to all 
rest ones. If the text at issue is taken out of its natural context, 
in which it has appeared initially, and incorporated to other 
relevant context, its meaning will not be changed.  
In fact, that in the sense of absolute independence can be 
hardly referred even to a present mathematical theory. As the 
discussion of the third case will show, those absolutely 
“acontextual” theories do not exist in principle just as any 
quantum system, what any physical entities is, cannot be 
separated absolutely from its environment in virtue of the 
Kochen – Specker theorem [67]. The meant “ideal case” is 
unachievable by any real theory even by a mathematical one. 
The term “slightly” can be anyway described as to practical 
use by the model of a mathematical theory, in which can miss 
some notions or axioms as well as the proof of completeness 
and consistency including the mutual independence of its 
axioms. Euclid’s geometry can be a great example of using 
“slightly” relevantly. Indeed, it had been the standard of how  
a scientific theory should look like throughout many centuries 
and even millennia. That standard turns out to be too high even 
nowadays for many sciences out of the scope of the exact ones. 
Besides being preliminary almost mathematized at least 
implicitly as slightly differing from its ideal type, any theory 
falling within the first case can be considered as the intension 
of an extended notion or as the definition of that notion. Thus 
it can be directly defined in terms of information in the sense 
of Piers [73]: any theory, of course being furthermore a “sign”, 
should not be “an icon” conveying information about 
everything or nothing [74]. The applicability of Peirce’s 
“information” is quite natural after its definition of “state of 
information” [74] almost coincides with a result after Husserl’s 
eidetic reduction.  
Though its explicit extension can comprise infinitely many 
individuals, the intension can be always chosen to be finite. 
This corresponds to the principle of abstraction [1] as to set 
theory: any infinite set can be described by a relevant property 
expressible finitely. 
Being representable as a set, it is both unambiguously 
distinguished from its environment, and its elements from each 
other. One can say that the first case is well-modelable in terms 
of set theory. This is not surprising at all for one of the natural 
contexts, in which the set theory itself appeared, was that of that 
kind of theories.  
(5) Unlike the first case, the second case does not offer 
historical and even only natural interpretation. It should be 
involved for the distinction of the constructive from non-
constructive mathematization.  
If both, an arbitrary text and the axiom of choice are given, 
a finite set as those in the first case and equivalent to the text 
has to exist but only “purely and mathematically”. This means 
that finite set in question cannot be demonstrated in principle 
as one and the same in any way. That pure existence as any pure 
existence in mathematics is useless for practice. That text is 
mathematizable in principle, but nobody knows how. Even the 
corresponding equivalent mathematical form might be 
provably inexpressible explicitly.  
Nevertheless, that second case hints the method, in which 
the practically significant third case might be researched and 
proved.         
 That existence in the second case is grounded on Skolem’s 
relativity of the concept of set (1922) after the axiom of choice 
[22], also known as Skolem’s paradox. 
Indeed, let us admit that any text doubtlessly being finite 
anyway can be represented as a certain set though infinite in 
general. (That assumption will be discussed and justified  
a little later.)  After the axiom of choice is given, it can be well-
ordered and therefore enumerated, i.e. a natural number can be 
attached unambiguously to each one element of the set. 
Peano arithmetic [75] implies that any natural number is 
finite. Indeed, 1 is finite; adding 1 to any finite number, one 
obtains a finite number again; then, all natural numbers are 
finite according to the axiom of induction. One can obtain 
infinite natural numbers only if the existence of at least one 
infinite natural number is postulated. However, there is not 
such an axiom, at least among Peano’s.  
Then, the set in question, after having been well-ordered, is 
furthermore enumerated by successive finite numbers. It is 
possible only if it itself is a finite set. Summarizing, the axiom 
of choice and Peano arithmetic imply that any infinite set can 
be enumerated and therefore mapped one-to-one by a certain 
finite set equivalent to a certain initial segment of natural 
numbers. It was just still Thoralf Skolem (1922) who pointed 
out expressively that concept of ‘set’ is relative even to the 
distinction “finiteness – infinity” [22] after the two 
assumptions. 
However, that corresponding finite set exists only purely: it 
cannot be demonstrated explicitly ever in principle once the 
axiom of choice is utilized. 
That pure existence might be equated to the random choice 
of an initial segment of natural numbers. That additional 
assumption seems to be consistent to the first two ones after 
one of them is just the axiom of choice [76]. Furthermore, 
though the corresponding finite set is randomly chosen after 
each one experiment for that set to be attached to an infinite set, 
one can admit that the probability distribution for some finite 
11 
 
set to be attached to a certain infinite set is unambiguously 
determined. 
The latter two additional assumptions though unnecessary 
for the correspondence between finite and infinite sets (the 
former two ones are sufficient) allow of unambiguously linking 
of a probability distribution to each infinite set [77].  
The initial assumption that any text can be represented as an 
equivalent set infinite in general will be discussed now. If it is 
granted, one can trace the pathway for universal though yet 
nonconstructive mathematization. However, it seems just like 
petitio principii for set theory is the ground of mathematics. 
If any theory being a text in general is declared to be a set, 
this presupposes already the principle of universal 
mathematization. 
The same consideration refers to the discussion of the first 
case, too. There, any theory differs slightly from the ideal type, 
which is postulated to be that of mathematical theory. If it is 
granted, it seems to be obvious that theory should be 
mathematizable. 
The same kind of petitio principii will be referable after the 
discussion of the third case a little later. Then, the question 
about what is the meaning and value of such a principle of 
universal mathemazibility and its proof is natural.  
If one presupposes that any scientific theory is 
mathematizable, it turns out to be just that. 
Its meaning and value might be interpreted as follows. One 
can postulate and therefore choose that universal 
mathemazibility or not. If the former is the case, there is a 
certain relevant mathematical structure, which can be found.  
Nonetheless, one can choose not to mathematize the theory 
at issue. Consequently, the proof is able only to demonstrate 
that principle is independent and eventually consistent to 
human cognition and its ground.  
One can compare the situation with the discovery of non-
Euclidean geometry [78]. One can accept a certain negation of 
Euclid’s fifth postulate searching for any contradiction and 
therefore for a proof of the fifth postulate by reduction ad 
absurdum. However, that contradiction is not found. Even 
more, one can construct a model of non-Euclidean geometry 
inside in the Euclidean geometry itself. Consequently, the 
consistency of Euclidean geometry implies the consistency of 
non-Euclidean geometry, too. 
Analogically, the principle of mathematizability says: the 
consistency of any scientific theory implies the consistency of 
its mathematized build; the choices to mathematize or not are 
both acceptable and equally consistent.   
Nobody is forced to mathematize. This is a free choice, 
which is justifiable.  
(6) The third case, the properly mathematically interesting 
one, refers to the addition of constructiveness in a consistent 
way to the second case discussed just above. This needs 
Husserl’s fundamental and philosophical considerations about 
reality and “phenomenon” in his sense explicitly. Furthermore, 
one has to interpret them in terms of Peano arithmetic and apply 
to set theory. 
The introduction of the kinds of reductions in his sense is 
crucial. Those are: “eidetic reduction”, “phenomenological 
                                                 
4 Here “meaning” is used as Frege’s “Bedeutung” [30], but not as 
reference or referent. The latter is inacceptable for reality should not be 
presupposed. 
reduction”, and “transcendental reduction”. He declared that all 
the three share one and the same meaning4 utilized in three 
different contexts: correspondingly mathematics, psychology 
and philosophy. Those three ones share furthermore a special 
attitude to reality, which is not the natural one, for it itself as a 
whole is a subject of research. Consequently, its existence 
cannot be presupposed as mankind and all other sciences have 
always done. That “natural attitude” is to be “bracketed” as to 
the range of each of them. Thus both psychology and 
philosophy might be transformed into “rigorous sciences” what 
mathematics is. 
The present paper can be interpreted as an approach to the 
generalization of Husserl’s idea from the scope of psychology 
and philosophy to that including any scientific theory. The 
latter can be always mathematized in a constructive way and 
thus transformed into a “rigorous scientific theory” if one 
wishes. 
Husserl’s terms “epoché” and “bracketing” [7, 9] serve to 
express that nonstandard attitude to reality. It is not rejected if 
one utilizes those terms. It is neither rejected nor accepted. The 
problem of reality is remained open to be possible its research 
by scientific methods. After that problem is presupposedly 
open, one can investigate what remains just by a kind of 
reduction certain according to the corresponding domain: 
mathematics, psychology, or philosophy. Until Husserl, the 
method had been explicitly developed only in mathematics.  
Its essence is given in Husserl’s manner of thought by the 
concept of eidetic reduction [7], [79]. One can remove one by 
one the properties of anything questioning after each one 
removing whether the investigated thing continues to be the 
same. If yes, the process continues by the next removing, and 
if not, the last removing is cancelled, i.e. the process is returned 
to the immediately antecedent state, and the property at issue is 
enlisted into the eidos of the thing5. Then the process continues 
as initially. 
The most essential feature of that algorithmic procedure is 
its constructiveness as to the present consideration. One will 
obtain the eidos of the investigated thing as an ultimate and 
unambiguous result. 
That thing will turn out to be axiomatized as to mathematics. 
It can be exhaustedly restored deductively from its axioms and 
any of its properties will be proved as a theorem.  
However, a finite set of properties can distinguish only a 
finite set of individuals. Consequently, if the set of individuals 
is infinite, as usual in mathematics, it needs a set of property, 
which cannot be finite, for the set of all subsets of any finite set 
is finite in turn.  
Furthermore, if the above procedure is represented by Peano 
arithmetic, there is no guarantee that it can be accomplished. 
The thing has an infinite set of properties for it is defined in set 
theory. However, Peano arithmetic does not include infinite 
natural numbers for the axiom of induction, as this is 
demonstrated above. The procedure is representable in Paeno 
arithmetic, but it refers to set theory. The former does not 
include infinity, and the latter does. The only consistent way 
out is that the procedure will not finish to be able to reconcile 
finiteness to infinity. 
5 Which corresponds to the state of information of that thing in Peirce 
[74]. 
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That way out is not relevant as to the discussed procedure 
for the eidos of the anything to be obtained.  
One needs to postulate the existence of at least one infinite 
natural number and therefore to generalize Peano arithmetic 
and axioms. The same postulate is historically equivalently 
realized by the concept and axiom of transfinite induction [80] 
generalizing those of induction in Peano arithmetic [81].  
Indeed, the transfinite induction replaced that of induction 
in Peano arithmetic allows of resolving the problem of 
reconciling arithmetic, set theory, and the discussed procedure 
for obtaining eidos consistently. The transfinite induction 
implies the existence of natural numbers, which are not finite 
as well as that the procedure referring to an infinite set of 
properties is able to finish. 
The case where the procedure cannot finish corresponds to 
Gödel’s “undecidable statements” (1931) [82] for they appear 
also on the boundary between Peano arithmetic and set theory. 
Indeed, the former does not admit infinity unlike the latter, and 
the only way to reconciled consistently to each other is the 
existence of those statement, the resolving of which cannot 
finish. 
On the contrary, they disappear into thin air after transfinite 
induction has been applied as in Gentzen’s proof (1936) [80, 
83], which is also coherent with the consideration just above.    
Husserl’s approach for “bracketing reality” also leads to an 
equivalent of transfinite induction once it is interpreted in terms 
of arithmetic and set theory. Here is how: 
There are two disjunctive options: to “bracket reality” or 
not; this corresponds to adding a single bit with two values: 
“consciousness” and “reality”. If that bit has not been added at 
all, this is a “phenomenon”, which is equally relevant to both 
consciousness and reality. Of course, that extremely simplified 
scheme is necessary only for the interpretation in terms of 
arithmetic, which by itself is too simple. 
One can summarize that only a single bit to be always 
addable is sufficient. However, the so-called function successor 
within the framework of Peano arithmetic as if guarantees the 
same, and this is not enough. In fact, the additional bit, meaning 
the bracketing of reality as a whole, should refer to the Peano 
arithmetic itself as a whole. So, the additional bit does not 
double any natural number, but doubles the set of all natural 
numbers given by the Peano axioms and thus generates a 
second Peano arithmetic absolutely independent of the first one 
though identical to it. 
Then, the latter can be interpreted as the “arithmetic of 
infinity”. The Peano axiom of induction is absolutely enough 
within each of them, but irrelevant as to the transition between 
them. That transition needs transfinite induction.  
As the elucidated link from the additional bit to transfinite 
induction is a chain of equivalencies, the reversion from 
transfinite induction to an additional bit in the sense above is 
valid, too.  
This accomplishes the sketch of the proof in the third case. 
That arithmetical model of reality also excludes the Gödel 
undecidable statements in Gentzen’s manner [80].  
                                                 
6 Here is used the term “being” in a fundamental and philosophical 
sense for the usual terms of that kind, such as “the world” or “reality”, 
make sense only in the context of the first alternative, that of Gödel 
mathematics. So, their utilization is irrelevant if the problem at issue is 
to be discussed without bias. 
One can utilize the term “Gödel mathematic” if the principle 
of universal mathematizability is not accepted and there are 
statements which cannot be resolved. They would correspond 
to non-mathematizible scientific theories. 
For the Hilbert program [84] of how mathematics might 
self-found itself, one can call that kind of mathematic, where 
the principle of universal mathematizablity is valid, “Hilbert 
mathematic”. There are not undecidable statements or non-
mathematizable scientific theories in it for Gentzen’s proof [80, 
83]. 
The ontological status of the two kinds of mathematics is 
quite different: 
The Gödel mathematics corresponds to Husserl’s “natural 
attitude” to reality. It exists as external and qualitatively 
different from mathematics. It is consistent to the most 
philosophies of mathematics.  
The Hilbert mathematics would correspond to Husserl’s 
“epoché” to reality. It is able to include reality within itself. The 
kinds of Pythagoreanism would be the most relevant to it.  
The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to 
Hilbert mathematics. As in relation to the principle, anyone is 
free to choose between Gödel mathematics and Hulbert 
mathematics. Whatever would be the choice both alternatives 
are consistent and justifiable.  
8. THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
The philosophical interpretation of the principle was touched 
many times above in the corresponding link to concrete 
questions. 
There is still one way of interpretation if one would like to 
elucidate which mathematics is more relevant to our being6: 
whether Gödel mathematics or Hilbert mathematics. It should 
deduce the “elements of being”7 in each case.  
The answer as to Gödel mathematics is well investigated: 
mathematics and reality does not share common elements: the 
ones, in mathematics, are ideal and the others, in reality, right 
real. Different degree of correspondence between them as well 
as various hypotheses or theories can be admitted, however 
they are always two fundamentally different types even in the 
cases where the one type is suggested to be reducible to the 
other.  
As to Hilbert mathematics, the problem is not yet 
researched. Here is an approach outlined: 
The three cases in the sketch of proof above correspond to 
finite set, infinite set non-constructively, and infinite set 
constructively. The first and third cases can be unified as 
constructive (any finite set is trivially constructive), and 
opposed to the second one, right non-constructive.  
The sketched way of proof in the case of constructiveness 
refers to arithmetic whether the Peano one (the first case) or the 
one generalized by transfinite induction (and equivalent to two 
Peano aritmetics).   
7 Those can be thought as a kind of reminiscence of Einstein, Podolsky, 
Rosen’s “element of reality” [85] in a quite different, and even opposite 
context. 
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Discussing the second case above, that of non-
constructiveness, two last assumptions were made at the end:  
(1) Pure existence might be equated to the random choice of 
an initial segment of natural numbers.  
(2) Probability distribution for some finite set to be attached 
to a certain infinite set features unambiguously the certain 
infinite set. 
They trace an alternative way for that constructiveness to 
infinite sets, which does not need arithmetic, the well-ordering 
principle and the axiom of choice in the final analysis, though 
the way was above pioneered by means of the latter two ones. 
Its essence consists in “bracketing” finiteness as follows: 
The transition from any infinite set to a randomly 
corresponding finite initial segment of the natural numbers 
needs indeed the axiom of choice. However, once the 
corresponding probability distribution is constructed, it can be 
postulated as corresponding to the infinite set at issue. Then the 
transition from one infinite set to any other one is an operator 
of probability distributions, which does not need the axiom of 
choice at all.     
The relation of infinity to finiteness, though being 
fundamentally random, is involved indirectly, by its ultimate 
result of a certain probability distribution, the transformation of 
which is not random anymore in turn. This is meant as 
“bracketing finiteness”: it differs from ignoring finiteness. If 
the latter was the case, infinity might be treated as a second 
finiteness as after exploring a second Peano arithmetic for 
transfinite induction, but indistinguishable from the first one.  
One remains in the transformations of only infinite sets, 
however determinable unambiguously to the finiteness as a 
whole right by the probability distributions. 
So, two ways of representing infinity sets may be 
distinguished accordingly. The one is grounded on probability 
distributions, the other on arithmetic generalized relevantly. 
One can suggest that both approaches should be equivalent 
to each other, and even that the one can be referred to “reality” 
and the other to “mathematics” if need be for comparing with 
“Gödel mathematics”.  
In turn, the utilization of probability distributions can 
significantly facilitate elaborating mathematized builds of 
scientific theories if the above equivalence holds.  
If any well-confirmed and fundamental scientific fact can be 
considered as an interpretation of that equivalence, it will be in 
favor of the hypothesis of Hilbert mathematics as to our being.  
At last, that universal kind of elements shared by both 
mathematics and reality in Hilbert mathematics coincides with 
the concept and quantity of information [86]. 
Indeed, Peano arithmetic can be interpreted as a universal 
Turing machine processing a tape consisting of bits, i.e. of the 
elementary units of information. Any real computer can be 
modeled as a Turing machine, which “tape” is always finite if 
the computer can finish its work. This corresponds to the case 
of Peano arithmetic.  
Its generalization as above for transfinite induction needs a 
corresponding generalization of Turing machine: the 
introduction of results calculable by transfinite “tapes” is 
sufficient. No real computer existing until now can be modeled 
as having that “transfinite tape” 
The case of probability distributions can be represented as  
a quantum Turing machine processing qubits rather than bits 
and a tape, in which all bits are replaced by qubits. A qubit is 
defined in quantum mechanics and theory of quantum 
information as the normed superposition of two orthogonal 
subspaces of the complex Hilbert space. Thus, the complex 
Hilbert space itself can be represented as the tape of the 
quantum computer, in which different wave functions 
(interpretable as the states of physical systems) are processed. 
A qubit can be considered as that generalization of a bit, 
which refers to an infinite series or to an infinite set of 
alternatives just as a standard bit is defined as the choice 
between two equally probable alternatives.   
The corresponding kind of information is quantum 
information. Indeed, the wave functions processed by  
the quantum Turing machine can be interpreted as the 
characteristic functions of those probability distributions 
specifying the corresponding infinite sets at issue. 
Consequently, a kind of information is what is (i.e. the 
being) in all cases. Information can be represented as a finite 
series of bits, as a transfinite series of bits, or as a series of 
qubits [87]. 
Where Hilbert mathematics is valid, all is information.              
9. AN EXAMPLE OF USE 
As this is demonstrated above, there are three “kinds” of 
information and their corresponding units: bits, transfinite bits 
(i.e. bits in transfinite positions or in other words, those 
corresponding to the second Peano arithmetic), and qubits. The 
option of being equated to each other is natural for Hilbert 
mathematics, but anyway consistent with Gödel mathematics. 
The difference between the two cases is rather philosophical 
and interpretational than formal: 
If Hilbert mathematics is the case, information is one single, 
and the kinds of information are identical in definitions though 
expressed differently. However, the kinds of information are 
different in definition as to Gödel mathematics, but they might 
be equated to each other occasionally. 
Consequently, any corroboration in favour of each of them 
needs the distinction whether the case of information equation 
is fundamental or partial and thus depends again on the a priori 
philosophical framework of interpretation. 
For example, if a fundamental equation in quantum 
mechanics such as the Schrödinger equation is interpreted as an 
information equation successfully, the question whether it is in 
favour of Hilbert mathematics depends on whether the quantum 
mechanics itself is accepted as fundamental. For it is only a 
science among many others, it cannot be privileged. For any 
entity is a quantum system, it is fundamental. However, even 
in the latter case, the fundamentality of quantum mechanics 
might be accepted only as to all physical entities and rejected 
as to mathematics. 
We met again the necessity of “petitio prinicipii”: The 
choice between Hilbert mathematics or Gödel mathematics 
seems to be presupposed even to our being. Each of them is 
postulable, but none of them is preferable or rejectable. 
Anyway, the existence of reasons to be preferred the one, 
though unknown until now, cannot be also refused. 
Indeed, the Schrödinger equation is not too difficult to be 
interpreted in terms of an information equation in the sense 
above: 
(1) The Planck constant might equate the physical 
quantity of action to information, for the latter is physically 
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dimensionless and possesses a natural quant, a bit: the quantity 
of information cannot be less than a bit ever. 
(2) Since transfinite series are used, the physical action 
of those would turn out to be also transfinite and thus 
inconvenient immediately. One should utilize the physical 
action per a unit of the length of series. The corresponding 
physical quantity might be identified as ‘time’, and the physical 
action per a unit of series as ‘energy’. Indeed, the Schrödinger 
equation is dimensioned in energy and thus refers to the 
equation of energies. Consequently, that fact is also consistent 
to the interpretation of the Schrödinger equation as an 
information equation.  
(3) The transfinite segments of bits per a unit of segment 
should not be distinguishable from the finite ones. 
Consequently, the utilization of energy identifies the cases of 
bits and transfinite bits. One can speak of bits generally 
meaning both classical and transfinite bits once their energy 
equivalent is used. 
(4) The Schrödinger equation compares a kind of energy in 
its left part to the sum of two kinds of energy in its right part. 
These two kinds of energy in the right part correspond to the 
kinetic and potential energy in classical mechanics, and their 
sum to the total mechanic energy. The left part is dimensioned 
as energy, too, but it has not any correspondence in classical 
mechanics.  
(5) That new kind of energy is proportional to the first time 
derivative of the wave function. The wave function itself can 
be considered as the characteristic function of a probability 
distribution and thus attachable to a certain infinite set as above. 
According to the equivalency of the kinds of information, the 
same infinite set can be represented by a transfinite series, and 
its time derivative interpreted accordingly as the energy of a 
transfinite bit or a bit for (3) above in the final analysis. 
(6) A qubit is isomorphic to a usual 3D unit ball, in which 
two points are chosen: the one within the ball, the other on its 
surface (which is a unit 3D sphere). Furthermore, the latter 
point has to be on the circle which is perpendicular to  
the straight line, determined by both centre of the ball and 
former point.  Then, that unit ball with two points chosen can 
be interpreted as a space ball in Minkowski space-time for 
some moment 𝑡𝑡 and with a radius 𝑐𝑐. 𝑡𝑡 (𝑐𝑐 is the velocity of light 
in vacuum). 
(7) Any qubit depends on the square of space distance after 
the construction in (6), and its change would correspond to  
the second derivative of space distance. This is consistent both 
to the interpretation of information as action in (1) and to the 
operator (∇2) of kinetic energy in the right part of  
the Schrödinger equation. 
(8) If the consideration is restricted to a qubit rather than to 
its change as in (7), the qubit determines a position in space  
(the space ball defined as above). That position can be 
interpreted as the argument of the function of potential energy, 
which is the other member in the sum of total mechanic energy 
in the right part of the Schrödinger equation.  
(9) Meaning the algebraic signs in the Schrödinger equation, 
one can summarize a purely informational interpretation of it: 
the energy of a qubit is equal to the sum of the change of the 
energy of that qubit and the energy of the equivalent bit 
                                                 
8 All conceptions of “quantum mind” [88], [89] imply the same or 
similar of that. 
according the generalized sense of ‘bit’ in (3). In other words, 
the difference of information expressed in qubits and in bits is 
equal to its change (expressed in qubits) after information 
(action) is relevantly transformed in energy (action per a unit 
of time). 
Though the Schrödinger equation admits a pure 
informational interpretation as above, it is consistent anyway to 
the hypothesis for Gödel mathematics separating mathematics 
from reality. To reject the latter, one should manage to 
demonstrate somehow that wave function can be attached to 
consciousness as well8, and the Schrödinger equation expresses 
in fact the fundamental relation of consciousness and reality or 
even a more fundamental essence. That more fundamental 
essence might be identity of any entity as a whole or as 
consisting of parts just right another idea of Husserl: the formal 
doctrine about parts and whole: Division 3 in Volume 2 of 
“Logical Investigations” [5], [90]. 
The problem of quantum mechanics to unify the discrete and 
continuous motions and that of philosophy to unify the discrete 
leap between consciousness and reality and continuous 
transition between them seem to share simile and even maybe 
one and the same structure expressible informationally by the 
Schrödinger equation. 
10. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The principle of universal mathematizability refers to any 
scientific theory as it is always exhibited in a natural language 
as a text. Even the texts of a more extended class are 
mathematizable, but this is out of the scope of the present 
consideration. The term of scientific theory is used in the sense 
of internal consistency of the text and thus includes not only the 
theories confirmed by experience and experiments, but also all 
scientific hypotheses not yet corroborated or already rejected. 
 The principle states that both a relevant and exhausted 
mathematical structure can be chosen for any scientific theory 
and that choice can be constructive. 
Investigating an eventual sketch for proving it, a series of 
interesting circumstances appear: 
First of all, the principle seems to be rather a most 
fundamental axiom referring to the relation of mathematics and 
reality. Consequently, it cannot be proved or refused in a proper 
sense. What is possible is to be demonstrated that it does not 
lead to any contradiction or to construct a model of the 
mathematics accepting it in the mathematics rejecting it. 
The way is by means of elucidating the mismatch of (Peano) 
arithmetic and set theory in relation to infinity in the foundation 
of mathematics. Peano arithmetic does not admit infinite 
natural number unlike set theory postulating infinite sets. Gödel 
unresolvable statements appear of the stick between them. 
Further, one can show that any statement of that kind 
correspond to some non-mathematizable scientific theory. 
Therefore, the principle of universal mathematizabilty is 
inconsistent to the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) [82]. 
Anyway, other article [91] has already demonstrated that Gödel 
proof implicitly accepts reality external to mathematics, and the 
existence of unresolvable statements is not more than a new, 
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but equivalent expression of that assumption, which is right 
modelled by the relation of Peano arithmetic and set theory.  
The mentioned relevant historical fact allows for the 
metamathematical postulate about reality as external to 
mathematics to be assigned to those theorems, and the kind of 
mathematics sharing it to be called Gödel mathematics.  
On the contrary, if Peano arithmetic is generalized by 
replacing the axiom of induction by that of transfinite 
induction, the mismatch in question disappear as well as  
the Gödel unresolvable statement as Gentzen’s proof (1936) 
[80,83] can be interpreted in particular. 
The present paper follows another pathway grounded on 
Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve 
the generalized arithmetic equivalent to that just above and 
necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative 
ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics, 
but reality is included within mathematics. That latter 
mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called 
Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-
founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. 
The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to 
Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. 
Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the 
problem which of the two mathematics refers to our being; and 
vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would 
confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. 
A few directions for future work can be: 
(1) A rigorous formal proof of the principle as an 
independent axiom. 
(2) The further development of information ontology 
consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much 
more natural for Hilbert mathematics. 
(3) The development of the information interpretation of 
quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for 
information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics. 
(4) The description of consciousness in terms of 
information ontology.      
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